Introduction
Designed to fill the CAPSTONE requirement for the United States Military Academy's Information Assurance course in 2001, the Cyber Defense Exercise (CDX) pits teams of cadets from each of the five US service academies against security experts within the Department of Defense. Each team is challenged to design, implement, and manage an operational network of computers. Management of various platforms (Windows, LINUX, Solaris, FreeBSD, etc.) is required and services such as web, email, public key infrastructure, and database sharing must be provided. Students are encouraged to establish architecture, policy, and procedures that invoke a defense-in-depth and defense-inbreadth posture to keep the aggressors at bay. To keep the playing field level, security measures are limited to open source freely available tools. Strategies and techniques employed by the students that were tested on the CDX battlefield have provided industry, academia, and government with valuable lessons. These lessons are related to work in network mapping, port scanning, vulnerability scanning, password integrity checking, network .monitoring tools, intrusion detection systems, host-based and network-based firewalls, and layer-two bridges.
As the competition begins, the National Security Agency (NSA) -led Red Force identifies vulnerabilities and launches repeated attacks on each network over a fourday period. Students have the ability to enter into direct cyber combat in an effort to keep services on-line and running. Teams are then evaluated on maintaining services as well as efforts to recover from and prevent future security breaches. home the trophy in 2003, Figure 1 The CDX has resulted in an intense rivalry hetween the academies and has become a staple of each academy's information assnrance curriculum The DoDs investment in this project has already reaped extraordinary benefits and the sky is the limit. The CDX should serve as a model for inter-agency programs as there are several players involved each year whose vision and dedication make this effort a success. In just three years the number of personnel involved in carrying-out and participating in the exercise has grown from approximately 40 to over 300. 
White Cell Lays the Groundwork
The White Cell developed the scenarios and anomalies, established the scoring criteria, refereed the exercise, and determined the winner based on the effectiveness of each academy to m i n i i e the impact to their network of the Red Forces malicious activities. Students were warned to be prepared for the unexpected as anomalies were injected with absolutely no warning and the Red Forces owned a rogue box on each academy's CDN capable of launching stealthy attacks. The mission's success relied upon the availability and integrity of all required information and survivability of the networks functionality. In order to maintain an effect network over a one-week active period, students would have to design and build with information assurance as a comerstone ... something we all should be doing don't you think?
Schedule of Engagement
After months of hard work in analyzing the requirements, conceptualizing and defming a design, and implementing a functional product tbe time came to face the enemy. Although all involved were primed as always to start, glitches bere and they make all involved wish for more time to prepare. Some stndents spend 20 hours per day in the lab during the weekends preceding the exercise. This level of effort is obviously put fortb for more than just a grade.
Early in the academic year each academy agreed to a common week of attack in which students would stand watch in their respective labs throughout the day while the White Cell utilized their systems manually and by way of automated tools both locally and remotely and the Red Forces performed their art. In order to ensure a clean start, the White Cell started verifying functionality and services a few days prior to the exercise for any school interested. They helped trouble shoot and get everyone on same page to ensure the best fight for all. This proved to be extremely valuable because in the past two exercises the Red Forces were requested to hold back on the fust day of activity while everyone made ready. It seemed no matter bow much time was given, the fmal tweaking came down to the last minute for all involved. A valuable lesson in ensuring adequate testing prior to going live is learned by faculty and students alike.
During the evenings of the exercise, students spend their time recovering, thinking of new and eloquent solutions and back-up plans, and documenting the results of the day's exploits and modifications to their system's configurations. The effectiveness of their efforts will be reflected in the scoring.
Anomalies
Each day without warning, anomalies are injected into the scenario. These operational irregularities test the student teams' andor their system ability to react on the fly. They can be as complex as requiring each team to stand up an anonymous FTF' server based on a commanders order to share information rapidly and readily to the other commands or as simplex as requiring a student to give up a system password as if someone was not diligent in providing password protection. They may include requiring all hands to man their battle stations such that no one is left to monitor logs and provide real time systems administration or they may be introduced as a piece of malicious software injected on a specific platform or service waiting for a specific time or event to execute. An anomaly may require a student user to load the latest intriguing piece of software made available via the Internet, which may introduce a new vulnerability, or it may require the student to fall back to an earlier version of software that is vulnerable to a well-known exploit. Whatever the anomaly, all participants are exposed equally .and their actions, procedures and policies to address them are evaluated.
Organization
The top-level architecture of the CDX is shown in Figure 2 . As indicated in the figure, each of the schools local area networks bad two Virtual Private Network (WN) nodes, one for providing services to each of the other participating schools, the White Cell and the Red Forces and another for the competing teams to evaluate their own systems from the vantage point of an outsider.
The use of the VPNs during the CDX provides an environment to conduct the exercise and to evaluate and "test drive" software before placing it into a production environment. It is intended to protect the integrity of the exercise as well as ensure any offensive measure taken by the Red Forces does not make it to the outside world. Any offensive action taken by the participating students is strictly prohibited and grounds for disqualification as only the Red Forces have the appropriate legal authority to attack.
White Cell members are located at each participating school to serve as a local referee and are directed by leadership located at a Headquarters stationed in Maryland. The White Cell uses a combination of automated tools and manual evaluation to determine service availability and the degree of compromise. They utilize a scoring criterion that invokes penalty points for loss of services andor compromises and provides redemption points for effective reporting. Penalty points assessed for service degradation are dependent upon time of outage while penalty points assessed for compromise depend upon root or user level access. It is critical to have coverage remotely and on-site as well as to work closely with the Red Force leaders to ensure de-confliction between cause and effect.
Post-Exercise Deliberations
Upon the conclusion of the exercise the White Cell works closely with the Red Forces to certify the rank and order of each team and as a result the winner of the CDX. In addition, they document the results and accounts of the activities throughout the exercise to provide and after action report for each school. They also conduct a telephone conference with all interested participants, which serve as an effective venue for leaming. This gives the students and faculty and opportunity fmd out all that the Red Forces knew and how successful or unsuccessful involved in providing valuable input to the White Cell during the planning and preparation phases. They are only limited in their tasks to avoid distributed Denial of Service (DOS) attacks to agreed upon times in the exercise since doing this early in the game could greatly the l i t the learning experience for all involved.
Organization
While the White cell had elements at each of the Cyber Defense Network (CDN Undergraduate students demonstrate their understanding of computer science at the graduate studies level. Strategies and techniques employed by these students go on to serve as examples that the NSA and CERT utilize to teach to industry professionals. Figure 3 shows the range of operating systems and network components used in CDX 2002. For CDX 2003, while all teams had the same hardware, each team could pick the operating system used to provide a required service. The Red Forces went through a sequence of activities to perform network intelligence gathering, execute intrusion attempts, conduct network attacks, and evaluate the effectiveness of their attacks.
Activities
A tcpdump file (about 5OOh4bytes) is available for the traffic over the net during the 2002 CDX. This data is almost totally malicious in nature since during the 2002 exercise the schools were required to provide a service but not to actively use the service. During 2003 there was considerahly more non-malicious traffic over the net since all schools were required to use the net to submit periodic reports and send messages, traffic generators were utilized by the Red Forces to hide their attacks, and the White Cell actively exhausted the services required to be provided. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a summary of some of what is involved in executing a Cyber Defense Exercise. Lessons learned are plentiful and continue to help us make this a better experience for the participants each and every year. Students have repeatedly told us that the CDX is the best educational activity they have experienced at the USMA. Red Forces individuals have also repeatedly informed us that they have both enjoyed participating in the CDX as well as benefited professionally from participating in the CDX. The CDX has been made possible by extensive support from the National Security Agency WSA) Public Key Infrastructure (F'KI) Management Office.
The benefits of the CDX are realized both at the highest levels of the DoD as well as the lowest levels at the academies. For example, the excitement of the CDX coupled with West Point's 2001 and 2002 victories, sparked interest among the entire carp of cadets. As a result, the fmt ever student information assurance group was formed at West Point. The club, afiliated with the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Special Interest Group for Security Audit and Control (SIGSAC) has now grown to over 450 student members (over 10% of the entire corps of cadets) representing each of the 13 academic majors. The iirst student chapter of its kind, SIGSAC includes a wide range of interdisciplinary activities and has members from every academic department. In fact in there second year of existence they earned honors from IEEE as student chapter of the year.
The CDX has proven to be an effective vehicle in increasing information assurance awareness, facilitating ethical education and debate, providing leadership development opportunities and generating excitement in students for information assurance.
